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 “Can you spare some change?” To a listener, these words of 
solicitation can be an annoyance, but to the speaker, these words are a 
plea for help and a means of survival. In September of 2014, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a Springfield ordinance that prohibited oral 
solicitations for money in Springfield’s downtown historic area.1 This 
Seventh Circuit decision is the latest in a string of decisions from the 
federal circuits on whether regulations on panhandling, like the one in 
Springfield, are constitutional under the First Amendment.2 
 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3 
Scholars, judges, and practitioners have found that free speech is 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Communication Studies and Environmental Studies, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. 
1 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014). 
2 See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014); Clatterbuck v. 
City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2013); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 
867 (6th Cir. 2013). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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essential to the preservation of democracy, the marketplace of ideas, a 
person’s sense of “personhood and autonomy,” and promoting 
tolerance in society.4 Although there are some types of speech that fall 
outside the protections of the First Amendment,5 charitable 
solicitations are a type of speech protected under the First 
Amendment.6 
 When government makes a restriction on speech that is 
protected by the First Amendment, the restriction is either content-
based or content-neutral. If a government regulation restricts speech 
because of “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content,” 
the government’s regulation is a content-based restriction.7 Content-
based speech restrictions are analyzed under strict scrutiny review, 
which means that for the restriction to be valid, the government must 
show that the restriction serves a compelling governmental interest 
that is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.8 On the other hand, a 
speech restriction is content-neutral when the government regulates 
the manner in which speech may be communicated, regardless of the 
message conveyed.9 Content-neutral speech restrictions are analyzed 
under intermediate scrutiny review, which means that for the 
restriction to be valid, the government must prove that the restriction 
serves a significant governmental interest and leaves open alternative 
channels of communicating the restricted speech.10 
                                                 
4 Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1208-12 (3d ed. 2009) 
(explaining several reasons why free speech is important, including Alexander 
Mikeljohn’s idea that free speech preserves democracy; Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ idea that free speech contributes to the marketplace of ideas; Justice 
Thurgood Marshall’s idea that free speech is central to one’s “personhood and 
autonomy”; and Professor Lee Bollinger’s idea that free speech promotes tolerance). 
5 See Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that 
the First Amendment does not protect speech involving obscenity, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, defamation, or fighting words). 
6 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
7 Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
8 Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). 
9 Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1537. 
10 Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Av. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976). 
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Other factors play into the analysis of a speech restriction. One 
significant factor is whether the restriction takes place in a public 
forum.11 A public forum is a place, such as a sidewalk or public park, 
that government is “obligated to make available for speech.”12 When a 
content-based speech restriction takes place in a public forum, the 
restriction is analyzed under strict scrutiny just like it would be in a 
non-public forum.13 However, when a content-neutral speech 
restriction takes place in a public forum, the speech restriction is 
analyzed more rigorously than if it took place in a non-public forum. 
Regulations that restrict speech in a public forum may only restrict 
speech according to the time, place, and manner in which the speech is 
delivered.14  The regulation also must be narrowly tailored to restrict 
no more speech than necessary.15 Because content-neutral restrictions 
of speech in public forums require a more rigorous standard of review, 
the determination of whether a restriction on speech takes place in a 
public forum and whether the restriction is content-based or content-
neutral has significant effect on the restriction’s constitutionality. 
 In Norton, the Seventh Circuit held that Springfield’s 
ordinance prohibiting panhandling in its historic downtown area was a 
content-neutral speech restriction.16 As a content-neutral restriction, 
the Seventh Circuit found that the ordinance was constitutional.17 
However, this Seventh Circuit decision is out of step with the federal 
circuit courts that have reviewed similar panhandling regulations. 
 Part I of this article explores the Supreme Court’s framework 
for analyzing cases involving solicitations. Then, Part II explores how 
the federal circuits have applied the Supreme Court’s analyses in 
solicitation cases to panhandling restrictions. Part III discusses the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Norton. Finally, Part IV argues that the 
Seventh Circuit misapplied the law and departed from the Supreme 
                                                 





16 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2014). 
17 Id. at 717. 
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Court’s framework and sister circuits in holding that the ordinance was 
content-neutral and valid under the First Amendment. 
 
I.  SUPREME COURT CASES ON SOLICITATION RESTRICTIONS 
 
 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality 
of panhandling restrictions, but the Court has ruled on several cases 
dealing with solicitations in general. In these cases, the Court’s 
determination of two factors played a significant role in the outcomes 
of the cases: (1) whether the forum was considered a public forum and 
(2) whether the restriction was a content-based or content-neutral 
speech restriction. 
 In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Village of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, that charitable solicitation is a form 
of speech protected by the First Amendment.18 In that case, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a municipal ordinance that required 
charitable organizations that solicited funds by door-to-door 
solicitations or by use of public streets to apply for a permit.19 A fine 
of up to $500 per offense was the punishment for charitable 
organizations that solicited contributions without obtaining a permit.20 
In granting these permits for charitable solicitations, the organizations 
must prove that at least 75 percent of the proceeds of their solicitations 
were used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.21 The 
ordinance explicitly stated that funds used for salaries or commissions 
for solicitors or used for administrative expenses of the organization 
could not be included as funds used for charitable purposes of the 
organization.22 
 Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), an Illinois not-for-
profit corporation, applied for a permit to solicit contributions.23 The 
village of Schaumberg denied CBE a permit because CBE could not 
                                                 
18 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
19 Id. at 622-23. 
20 Id. at 623. 
21 Id. at 624. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 624-25. 
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demonstrate that 75 percent of their solicitations would be used for 
charitable purposes as defined by the ordinance.24 CBE sued for 
injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the ordinance violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25 
 The Court, citing a string of cases, found that the First 
Amendment protects charitable solicitations because they “involve a 
variety of speech interests—communication of information, the 
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy 
of causes—that are within the protection of the First Amendment.”26 
Finding that charitable solicitations are protected speech, the Court 
went on to consider whether the ordinance’s requirement that 75 
percent of the solicitations must be used for charitable purposes was a 
valid restriction on CBE’s protected speech.27 The Court held that the 
75 percent requirement did not serve a sufficiently important 
governmental interest.28 Although the Village had an interest in 
protecting the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance, the 
Court found that the 75 percent requirement unnecessarily interfered 
with First Amendment freedoms of charitable organizations that used 
solicited funds to primarily engage in research, advocacy, or public 
education.29 The Court also noted that broad rules in the area of free 
expression are suspect.30 
 The village of Schaumburg decision is important in two 
respects. First, the Court found that the First Amendment protects 
charitable solicitations.31 Second, although the court did not specify 
whether the ordinance in the village of Schaumburg was a content-
based or content-neutral speech restriction, the Court established that 
speech restrictions cannot be overly broad and must be substantially 
related to the governmental interest.32 
                                                 
24 Id. at 625. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 632. 
27 Id. at 636. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 636-37. 
30 Id. at 637. 
31 Id. at 632. 
32 Id. at 636-37. 
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 One year after striking down the ordinance in Village of 
Schaumburg, the Court in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., upheld a Minnesota State Fair regulation 
requiring that “all persons, groups, or firms which desire to sell, 
exhibit, or distribute materials during the annual State Fair must do so 
only from fixed locations on the fairgrounds.”33 In that case, the 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) 
sought for injunctive relief to prohibit the regulation’s enforcement 
against ISKCON members. ISKCON claimed that the regulation 
violated its members’ First Amendment rights because it suppressed 
their ability to practice Sankirtan, a religious ritual wherein members 
distribute or sell religious literature, and to solicit donations for the 
religion in public places.34  
 In analyzing ISKCON’s claim, the Court first noted that the 
First Amendment “does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s 
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”35 
The Court further stated that speech restrictions are upheld when the 
restriction (1) is justified without reference to the content of the 
speech, (2) serves a significant governmental interest, and (3) leaves 
open alternative channels for communicating the regulated speech.36 
The Court first held that the regulation requiring that all distribution 
and sales of materials take place from fixed locations on the 
fairgrounds was not based on the content of the speech, and thus, it 
was a content-neutral restriction.37 The regulation was not open to the 
kind of arbitrary application consistent with content-based restrictions 
that have “the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a 
particular point of view.” 38 Instead, the State Fair’s method of 
allocating booths and other fixed locations on the fairground was a 
straightforward first-come, first-served system, and the regulation 
                                                 
33 452 U.S. 640, 643 (1981). 
34 Id. at 644-45. 
35 Id. at 647. 
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applied evenhandedly to all who wished to distribute or sell 
materials.39 
 Second, the Court found that the regulation served a significant 
governmental interest. The State had an interest in maintaining the 
“orderly movement of the crowd given the large number of exhibitors 
and persons attending the Fair.”40 Given the high attendance of fair-
goers, State’s interest in crowd control by confining distribution, 
selling, and solicitation activities to fixed locations served a substantial 
state interest.41  
 Third, the Court found that ISKCON members had alternative 
channels for their religious expressions. The ISKON members could 
distribute or sell materials in the area outside of the fairgrounds, or 
orally propagate their views inside the fair and point fairgoers to the 
fixed locations where they could distribute or sell materials.42 The 
Court noted that the State Fair was a limited-public forum with the 
purpose of allowing the greatest number of exhibitors to present their 
products or views and that the regulation requiring that exhibitors do 
so from fixed locations did not limit their ability to share their views.43 
 Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in Heffron, 
asserting that the State Fair regulation prohibiting the distribution of 
materials was not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.44 
Justice Brennan joined the majority in finding that the State Fair’s 
prohibition on sales and solicitations was constitutional, but he found 
that the State Fair’s ban on distributing literature was not narrowly 
tailored to serve the government’s interest in crowd control.45 Justice 
Brennan found that because the governmental regulation infringed on 
ISKCON members’ First Amendment rights, the regulation must be 
narrowly tailored to further a legitimate interest.46 If the State’s major 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 649-50. 
41 Id. at 654-55. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 655. 
44 Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 658. 
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concern was to avoid congestion and control crowds, then the 
regulation could have been more narrowly tailored to prohibit the 
distribution of literature by ISKCON at fairground points, such as 
entrances and exits, where congestion would occur.47 Justice Brennan 
concluded that because distributing literature was essential for 
ISKCON members’ religious expression, the State could have drafted 
a narrower rule that protected its interest in crowd control while 
respecting ISKCON member’s First Amendment rights.48  
 Several years after Heffron in 1990, the Court encountered 
another regulation prohibiting solicitations. In United States v. 
Kokinda, the Court upheld a United States Postal Service regulation 
that prohibited “soliciting alms and contributions” and “commercial 
soliciting and vending” on postal premises.49 In that case, members of 
the National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC) set up a table on 
the sidewalk near the only entrance to the Bowie, Maryland Post 
Office to solicit contributions and sell books and subscriptions related 
to their organization.50 During the several hours that the NDPC were 
outside the post office, postal employees received between 40 and 50 
complaints regarding their presence.51 When the postmaster asked the 
NDPC members to leave, the members refused and were subsequently 
arrested.52 A United States Magistrate Judge convicted the NDPC 
members of violating the postal service regulation prohibiting 
solicitations on postal premises.53 The convicted NDPC members 
appealed, asserting that the postal service’s regulation violated their 
First Amendment rights.54 
 The Court held that solicitation is a form of speech that is 
protected by the First Amendment, but that the postal service 
regulation was a valid content-neutral speech restriction under the 
                                                 
47 Id. at 662. 
48 Id. at 663. 
49 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 724 (1990). 
50 Id. at 723. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 723-24. 
53 Id. at 724 
54 Id. 
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First Amendment.55 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, found 
that the sidewalk outside of the post office was not a traditional public 
forum and thus, applied a test of reasonableness.56 The postal 
regulation did not suppress speech based on content because all groups 
were excluded from engaging in solicitation.57 Furthermore, the 
restriction was reasonable to prevent disruptions in post office 
business and impediments to the normal flow of traffic into and out of 
the post office.58 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, agreed 
with the plurality’s holding except as to the post office’s status as a 
traditional public forum.59 Justice Kennedy found that the sidewalk 
was not a traditional forum to accommodate speech and thus any 
restrictions on speech must be valid time, place, and manner 
restrictions.60 In this case, Justice Kennedy concluded that the post 
office’s regulation was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.61 
 Justice Brennan, joined by the three remaining justices, wrote a 
dissenting opinion in which he found that the sidewalk outside of the 
post office was a public forum and that the postal service regulation 
was not a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.62 
Citing a string of cases, Justice Brennan found that the sidewalk was a 
public forum or at the very least, a limited-purpose public forum.63 
Justice Brennan noted that content-based speech restrictions in a 
public or limited-purpose public forum must be narrowly drawn to 
serve a compelling governmental interest.64 Contrary to Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion, the dissent found that the postal 
service regulation was not content-neutral because the restriction was 
tied explicitly to the content of the speech.65 Because a person on 
                                                 
55 Id. at 722. 
56 Id. at 730. 
57 Id. at 736. 
58 Id. at 733-34. 
59 Id. at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
60 Id. at 738. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 743-52. 
64 Id. at 752. 
65 Id. at 753. 
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postal premises may say, “Please support my political advocacy 
group” but may not say, “Please contribute $10,” the restriction was 
content-based.66 Because the regulation is based on the concern that 
asking for money embarrasses or annoys the post-office-goer, the 
regulation is based on the content of the speech.67 Furthermore, Justice 
Brennan noted that the regulation prohibits all solicitation anywhere 
on postal service property, which “sweeps an entire category of 
expressive activity off of a public forum solely in the interest of 
administrative convenience.”68 Therefore, Justice Brennan found that 
the absolute prohibition on solicitation did not permit solicitation at 
any time or any place in the forum and thus was not a valid restriction 
that was narrowly tailored.69  
 Two years after the decision in Kokinda, the Court upheld 
another regulation prohibiting solicitations because it found that the 
regulation was a reasonable restriction.70 In International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, the Court upheld a Port Authority 
regulation that prohibited the sale or distribution of merchandise, 
flyers, or other written material, and the solicitation and receipt of 
funds in a “repetitive manner.”71 The Court first found that the Port 
Authority did not constitute a traditional public forum because airports 
and terminals like the Port Authority have never been traditionally 
used to promote freedom of expression, and the Port Authority’s 
purpose was not to promote expression but to facilitate travel.72 Thus, 
because the Port Authority was not a traditional public forum, the Port 
Authority could regulate solicitation as long as the regulation was 
reasonable.73 The Court held that it is reasonable to regulate 
solicitations in order to avoid disruptive effects, inconveniences, and 
risks of duress for passengers traveling in the terminals.74 The Court 
                                                 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 754. 
68 Id. at 753.  
69 Id. at 755. 
70 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675-77 (1992). 
71 Id. at 675-77.  
72 Id. at 682-83. 
73 Id. at 683. 
74 Id. at 684-85. 
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noted in particular that “face-to-face solicitation presents risks of 
duress that are an appropriate target of regulation.”75 
 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the 
majority’s finding in Lee that the airport terminal was not a public 
forum.76 Justice Kennedy found that the airport was a public forum, 
but that the airport’s blanket prohibition on in-person solicitations of 
money for immediate payment was narrow and a valid regulation on 
time, place, and manner of protected speech.77 Justice Kennedy argued 
that this ban on solicitations was directed at abusive practices and not 
any message or idea in particular, making this ban a content-neutral 
speech restriction.78 He also noted that conduct such as an immediate 
exchange for money implicates issues related to fraud and duress on 
those passing by in a way that allows the Port Authority to regulate 
it.79 Finally, Justice Kennedy stated that this ban left open alternative 
channels of communication because solicitors could explain their 
cause and request later payments through prepaid envelopes.80 
 In Kokinda and Lee, the Court’s holding depended on whether 
the forum was considered a public forum. The plurality in Kokinda 
found that the sidewalk outside the post office was not a public forum 
and applied the more lenient reasonableness test.81 Similarly, in Lee, 
the Court found that the Port Authority was not a traditional public 
forum and applied the same reasonableness test to the regulation.82 
The Court upheld both regulations as valid speech restrictions under 
the reasonableness test.83 The concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Kokinda,84 and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lee,85 
however, found that the forums in question were public forums or 
                                                 
75 Id. at 684. 
76 Id. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 705. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 705-06. 
80 Id. at 707. 
81 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990). 
82 Lee, 505 U.S. at 683. 
83 Id. at 755; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722. 
84 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 737-38, 740. 
85 Lee, 505 U.S. at 684. 
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limited-public forums. In both cases, Justice Kennedy found that the 
regulation was content-neutral and a valid time, place, and manner 
restriction.86 However, Justice Brennan in the dissenting opinion of 
Kokinda disagreed and found the regulation to be content-based and 
thus must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, which the regulation was not.87 The outcome of the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Kokinda and Lee depended on 
whether the restriction was classified as content-based or content-
neutral. 
 
II.  FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON 
PANHANDLING 
 
 Relying on these Supreme Court opinions, many federal 
circuits in recent years have reviewed restrictions on panhandling. In 
their analyses of regulations on panhandling, the federal circuits have 
disagreed on whether such restrictions on panhandling are content-
based or content-neutral speech restrictions. 
 For example, in Iskcon of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a National Park 
Service regulation on solicitation, distribution, and sales of goods on 
the National Mall as a content-neutral restriction.88 In Iskcon of 
Potomac, the Park Service regulation at issue prohibited, in relevant 
part, “soliciting or demanding gifts, money, goods or services.”89 The 
regulation defined solicitation to include only an in-person request for 
immediate payment.90 The court found that this solicitation prohibition 
was a content-neutral restriction because it did not regulate a type of 
expression or a specific message but instead regulated the manner in 
which the message could be conveyed.91 The court, citing Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lee, found that regulating in-person 
                                                 
86 Id. at 738; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 705. 
87 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 753. 
88 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
89 Id. at 954. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 955. 
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solicitations regulated the manner in which a message was conveyed, 
not the specific message itself.92 The D.C. Circuit next addressed 
whether the regulation was narrowly tailored. The court found that the 
regulation was not narrowly tailored because it substantially burdened 
more speech than necessary to achieve its interest in preserving the 
quality of experience for the visitors in the National Mall.93 
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in ACLU v. City of Las Vegas 
struck down an ordinance banning solicitation in Las Vegas’s 
downtown area.94 Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the ban on solicitation was a content-based ordinance.95 Although 
there was no content-based purpose behind the ordinance, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the ordinance on its face discriminated based on 
content.96 The ordinance defined solicitation as “to ask, beg, solicitor 
plead, whether orally or in a written or printed manner for the purpose 
of obtaining money, charity, business or patronage, or gifts or items of 
value for oneself or another person or organization.”97 Because the 
ordinance had the primary effect of suppressing or exalting speech of 
certain content, the court held that the ordinance was content-based.98  
 The court stated that when an ordinance is content-based, it is 
presumptively invalid and will only be constitutional if the 
government can demonstrate that it is the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling government interest.99 The Ninth Circuit, like 
the D.C. Circuit, recognized that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lee 
addressed this issue. The Ninth Circuit held that because the ordinance 
did not ban the act of solicitation but instead banned messages that 
contain soliciting content, the ordinance was content-based.100 Thus, 
as a content-based restriction, the ordinance was subject to strict 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 956. 
94 466 F.3d 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2006). 
95 Id. at 793. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 788. 
98 Id. at 793. 
99 Id. at 792. 
100 Id. at 796. 
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scrutiny review.101 The Ninth Circuit struck down the ordinance 
because the City conceded that “even the peaceful, unobstructive 
distribution of handbills requesting future support” would be 
prohibited, and thus the ordinance could not survive strict scrutiny.102 
 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Clatterbuck v. City of 
Charlottesville struck down a municipal ordinance that made it 
unlawful for any person to solicit money or sell goods within fifty feet 
of a main downtown intersection.103 The ordinance defined solicitation 
as “to request an immediate donation of money or other thing of value 
from another person, regardless of the solicitor’s purpose or intended 
use of the money or other thing of value.”104 The Fourth Circuit 
applied the analysis from its own prior case, Brown v. Town of 
Cary,105 which held that a restriction is content-based if it 
distinguishes content “with a censorial intent to value some forms of 
speech over others” and restricts speech because the government 
disagrees with the message or ideas.106 Because the ordinance 
prevented a solicitor’s speech when it involved immediate donations 
of things of value but allowed other types of solicitations, such as 
requests for future donations or things that have no value, the 
ordinance was based on the content of the solicitor’s speech.107 After 
determining that the ordinance involved a content-based speech 
restriction, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case back to the district 
court to determine the governmental interests in enforcing the 
ordinance.108 
 Within six months of Clatterbuck, the Sixth Circuit also struck 
down a Michigan statute that made it unlawful for a person to be 
found begging in a public place.109 The Sixth Circuit found that the 
Michigan anti-begging statute violated the First Amendment because it 
                                                 
101 Id. at 797. 
102 Id. 
103 708 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 2013). 
104 Id. 
105 706 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2013). 
106 Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 560. 
109 Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013). 
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
456 
was overbroad.110 The statute did not clarify what constituted begging. 
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit, worried about the chilling effect if left on 
the books, struck down the anti-begging statute.111 
 More recently, however, in Thayer v. City of Worcester, the 
First Circuit reviewed and upheld a Worcester city ordinance, the 
Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance.112 The Aggressive Panhandling 
Ordinance made it unlawful for any person to beg, panhandle or solicit 
any other person in an aggressive manner.113 The First Circuit first 
inquired as to whether the government adopted these ordinances 
restricting speech because the government disagreed with the message 
that the speech conveyed.114 The First Circuit determined that the 
ordinance was not content-based because the ordinances do not 
identify speech except by reference to the behavior, time, or location 
of its delivery.115 The First Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lee to find that certain in-person requests for immediate 
money could create a risk of fraud and duress.116 Finding that the 
ordinance was content-neutral, the First Circuit applied the 
intermediate level of scrutiny.117 Under intermediate scrutiny, the 
speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental purpose while leaving open adequate alternative 
channels of communication.118 The First Circuit found that the 
appellants failed to provide evidence showing that the ordinances were 





                                                 
110 Id. at 880. 
111 Id. at 878. 
112 755 F.3d at 64. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 67. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 69. 
117 Id. at 71. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 71-73. 
15
Zhang: The Panhandlers’ Dialogue: Are Restrictions on Panhandling Conten
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
457 
III.  NORTON V. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD 
 
 In September of 2014, the Seventh Circuit upheld a City of 
Springfield ordinance prohibiting panhandling.120 The ordinance 
provided that it is “unlawful to engage in an act of panhandling in the 
downtown historic district.”121 The ordinance defined panhandling as 
an oral request for immediate donation of money.122 The court noted 
that because panhandling was defined as an oral request, signs 
requesting money and oral requests to send money later were 
allowable under the ordinance.123 The downtown historic district is a 
small portion of the city area but comprises the city’s principal 
shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas.124 
Plaintiffs, Don Norton and Karen Otterson, received citations 
for violating this ordinance.125 Plaintiffs feared that further citations 
would result if they continued to panhandle and filed suit in the district 
court for a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the 
ordinance.126 Plaintiffs alleged that Springfield’s panhandling 
prohibition violated the First Amendment.127 In the district court, the 
parties agreed that panhandling is a form of speech that receives First 
Amendment protections.128 The parties also agreed that if this 
ordinance drew lines based on the content of the speech, the ordinance 
would be unconstitutional.129 The district court denied plaintiff’s 
preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance was content-
neutral.130 
                                                 
120 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2014). 
121 Springfield Municipal Code § 131.06(e).  
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 In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit 
first looked to its previous cases on this matter.131 Although the court 
encountered a prior case with similar facts in Gresham v. Peterson,132 
the question of whether anti-panhandling ordinances were content-
based or content-neutral was not presented in that case.133 Also, the 
Seventh Circuit noted the existing circuit split that exists with regards 
to this question. 
To determine whether the ordinance in Norton constituted a 
content-based speech restriction, the Seventh Circuit held that 
regulations are content-based when the regulation restricts speech 
because of the message or idea that it conveys or when the government 
disapproves of the message.134 The court stated that restrictions on 
panhandling do not fall into either one of those categories because the 
City is not restricting an idea or message or disapproving of said idea 
or message. Because the ordinance is indifferent to the purposes, if 
any, behind the solicitor’s appeal for money, the ordinance is not 
content-based.135 Instead, panhandlers are able to use signs, which are 
less threatening than oral requests, and still convey their message and 
have access to the marketplace of ideas.136 Citing to Justice Kennedy’s 
decision in Lee, the Seventh Circuit held that the regulation was 
narrowly tailored so that it dealt only with “potentially threatening” 
confrontations.137 The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance, finding 
that it was content-neutral and a permissible time, place, and manner 
restriction by the City.138  
 Judge Manion wrote a dissenting opinion in which he held that 
the ordinance was a content-based regulation that was subject to strict 
                                                 
131 Id. 
132 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000). 
133 Norton, 768 F.3d at 714. (citing Gresham, 225 F.3d at 899 (upholding an 
anti-panhandling ordinance in Indianapolis but not addressing the issue of content-
based restrictions because the parties agreed that it was content-based)). 
134 Id. at 717. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 716. 
138 Id. at 717-718. 
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scrutiny.139 Judge Manion distinguished this case from the Supreme 
Court cases of Lee, Kokinda, and Heffron by noting that each of the 
latter cases dealt with governmental restrictions on all forms of 
solicitation.140 The ordinance at issue, however, only restricted 
immediate oral requests for money.141 Furthermore, as for the circuit 
split, Judge Manion believed that the Seventh Circuit took “the path 
less-traveled” when it joined the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit in 
finding that the restrictions were content-neutral.142  
 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Manion distinguished Norton 
from the cases holding that panhandling statutes were constitutional. 
Judge Manion found that the ordinance in Thayer from the First 
Circuit differed because it targeted aggressive or repeated solicitations 
for money.143 The ordinance only made it unlawful for a person to 
repeatedly solicit money.144 Because the Springfield ordinance made 
all oral requests for money unlawful, the ordinance in Thayer was 
more permissive than the Springfield ordinance and thus should not 
have been followed by the Seventh Circuit.145In addition, Judge 
Manion dismissed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Kennedy because he 
believed that the D.C. Circuit misapplied the law.146 
 Moreover, Judge Manion suggested a new approach to 
determining whether a restriction is content-based. He suggested that 
the court “temporarily step into the shoes of the City’s enforcement 
authorities.”147 Under this ordinance, an enforcement authority must 
“listen to what the speaker is saying in order to determine whether the 
speaker violated the ordinance.”148 The authorities must discern three 
things from the speech: first, whether the speech is a request for 
money (potentially a violation) or a request for the listener’s time, 
                                                 




143 Id. at 720. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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signature, or labor (not a violation); second, whether the speech is a 
request for an immediate transfer of money (potentially a violation) or 
merely a request for the transfer of money at a future date (not a 
violation); third, whether the speech is a request for a charitable 
donation (potentially a violation) or a request for commercial 
transaction (not a violation).149Judge Manion found that because the 
authorities cannot determine if there is a violation of the ordinance 
without listening to and understanding what the speaker is saying, the 
ordinance is content-based.150 In his analysis, Judge Manion stated that 
the ordinance could not be content-neutral, as the majority held, 
because the ordinance did not impose a restriction based on the 
volume, location, or conduct accompanying the speech.151 
 In his dissent, Judge Manion stated that the Springfield 
ordinance prohibiting panhandling was a content-based speech 
restriction that was subject to strict scrutiny review.152 Thus, because 
the City did not prove that the ordinance meets strict scrutiny review, 
Judge Manion dissented from the majority and held that the ordinance 
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.153 
 
IV.  ARGUMENT 
 
 In Norton, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly characterized the 
City of Springfield’s ordinance prohibiting panhandling in the 
downtown historic district as a content-neutral speech restriction.154 
The Seventh Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s precedent and 
departed from the decisions of its sister circuits. The Supreme Court 
cases on solicitation have limited application because (1) the 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 722. 
152 Id. at 723. 
153 Id. 
154 The issue is whether the ordinance in Norton is a content-neutral or content-
based restriction on protected speech. The parties agreed that panhandling is a form 
of charitable solicitation that is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 714 
(majority opinion). 
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downtown area in Norton is a traditional public forum, and (2) the 
ordinance in Norton regulates specific content rather than conduct. 
 First, the downtown historic area in Norton is a traditional 
public forum.155 The Court in Heffron, Kokinda, and Lee, applied a 
more lenient test because the state fairgrounds, the post-office 
sidewalk, and the Port Authority terminals, respectively, were not 
traditional public forums.156 But, because the downtown historic area 
is a public forum, any speech restrictions must pass a more rigorous 
standard—they must be a valid time, place, manner restriction that is 
narrowly tailored.157 
 Second, the regulations in Heffron, Kokinda, and Lee were 
broadly applicable to anyone looking to solicit in the area. In Heffron, 
the state fair regulation prohibited anyone from distributing or selling 
flyers, literature, or other written works in the fairgrounds unless it 
was from a fixed location.158 Likewise, in Kokinda, the post office 
regulation prohibited anyone from soliciting contributions on post-
office grounds.159 Similarly, in Lee, the Port Authority regulation 
prohibited the soliciting and receipt of funds in a repetitive manner.160 
All three of these regulations applied to anyone looking to solicit and 
receive funds, regardless of the cause or reason for the solicitation. 
However, in Norton, the City ordinance specifically targeted oral 
requests for immediate donation of money.161 The ordinance singled 
out a specific type of message, for a specific cause, and linked to a 
particular group—the needy and the homeless. The Supreme Court has 
stated that speech restrictions are content based when the speech 
restriction has “the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a 
                                                 
155 Id. at 715. 
156 See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
655 (1981) (finding that the State Fair is limited-public forum); United States v. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (finding that the post-office sidewalk is not a 
traditional public forum); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 682-83 (1992) (finding that the Port Authority is not a traditional public forum).  
157 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 740. 
158 Heffron, 452 U.S. at 643. 
159 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 724. 
160 Lee, 505 U.S. at 675-77. 
161 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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particular point of view.”162 Unlike the regulations in Heffron, 
Kokinda, and Lee, the ordinance in Norton does not prohibit all 
solicitations in order to advance a governmental interest but instead 
targets one specific type of speech based on its content of requesting 
immediate donations of money. 
 As for the existing circuit split on panhandling regulations, as 
Judge Manion noted in his dissent, the Seventh Circuit did depart from 
its sister circuits in upholding the Springfield ordinance. Only one of 
the five circuit courts has upheld a regulation on panhandling—the 
First Circuit in Thayer.163 As Judge Manion noted, the ordinance in 
Thayer is different from the ordinance in Norton because the 
ordinance in Thayer specifically applied to repeated solicitations.164 
The ordinance in Norton is more similar to those in ACLU and 
Clatterbuck. Both of those cases determined that restrictions on 
panhandling are content-based and invalid under the First 
Amendment.165 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Clatterbuck, regulations 
are content-based when they distinguish content “with a censorial 
intent to value some forms of speech over others.”166 
 Many of the federal circuits in deciding this issue have cited to 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lee. However, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring decision also has limited application to this case. Justice 
Kennedy argued that prohibitions directed at abusive practices were 
content-neutral because such prohibitions regulated conduct and not 
content.167 The regulation in Lee regulated abusive practices because it 
prohibited “repetitive” solicitations for funds inside the terminals.168 In 
Norton, however, the ordinance prohibited any oral requests for 
money,169 which is not directed at conduct like the prohibition in Lee, 
                                                 
162 Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648. 
163 755 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2014). 
164 768 F.3d at 720 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
165 See ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2013). 
166 Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556. 
167 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 705 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
168 Id. 
169 Norton, 768 F.3d at 714. 
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but rather at the type of oral message. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence provided that there were alternative channels for those 
looking to solicit funds such as explaining their message and 
requesting money later.170 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion does not take into account that some solicitations for money 
cannot be received later, such as when the person is homeless or 
simply cannot wait for funds. His suggestion of prepaid envelopes 
might be an alternative channel for organizations and business looking 
to solicit funds but not for an individual looking for spare change to 
survive. 
 Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have considered Justice 
Brennan’s dissent in Kokinda. Justice Brennan explained that the 
postal service regulation was content-based because under the 
restriction, a person on postal premises could say, “Please support my 
political advocacy group” but could not say, “Please contribute 
$10.”171 He further explained that the regulation singled out this type 
of speech because it had the tendency to embarrass or annoy the post-
office-goer, which made it a content-based restriction.172 Along similar 
lines as Justice Brennan’s dissent, Judge Manion’s dissent stated that 
singling out a specific type of speech is content-based. Because the 
violation occurs as a result of the content of the words spoken—that 
the words are oral requests for the immediate donation of money—the 
ordinance in Norton is a content-based speech restriction.173 
 The ordinance in Norton is a content-based speech restriction 
that should have been subject to strict scrutiny review. The Seventh 
Circuit erred in deciding that the ordinance regulated conduct instead 
of content. The ordinance singles out one type of solicitation and 
unequivocally silences this type of solicitation simply because of its 
content. Instead of banning all solicitation in the downtown area, the 
City of Springfield has only targeted those solicitations that are most 
likely linked to the homeless and the needy. In its decision, the 
Seventh Circuit silenced the voices of a group in one stroke of 
                                                 
170 Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 754. 
173 Norton, 768 F.3d at 721 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
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categorization simply because the public disagrees or finds it difficult 




 The Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold a Springfield 
ordinance that prohibits panhandling in the downtown area has 
deprived a particular group of its ability to contribute their ideas and 
messages. Although the Supreme Court has yet to review any 
regulations on panhandling, the Supreme Court has upheld several 
regulations on solicitations. The Seventh Circuit misapplied the 
Supreme Court’s framework for determining when a restriction is 
content-based and content-neutral. In finding that the Springfield 
ordinance is content-neutral, the Seventh Circuit departed from its 
sister circuits. Because the ordinance is based on the content and the 
ideas of the speech, the ordinance is content-based and should not 
have been upheld without a compelling governmental interest that is 
narrowly tailored. To otherwise silence an entire category of speech, 
as the Seventh Circuit did, is to violate the First Amendment and 
deprive an already underrepresented group—the homeless and the 
needy—of their constitutional rights. 
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